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Abstract: This paper looks at the private schooling sector in Pakistan, a country that is 
seriously behind schedule in achieving the Millennium Development Goals. Using new data, 
we document the phenomenal rise of the private sector in Pakistan and show that an 
increasing segment of children enrolled in private schools are from rural areas and from 
middle-class and poorer families. The key element in their rise is their low fees-- the average 
fee of a rural private school in Pakistan is less than a dime a day (Rs.6)! They hire 
predominantly local, female and moderately educated teachers who have limited alternative 
opportunities outside the village. Hiring these teachers at low cost allows the savings to be 
passed on to parents through very low fees. This mechanism—the need to hire teachers with 
a certain demographic profile so that salary costs are minimized—defines the possibility of 
private schools—where they arise, fees are low. It also defines their limits. Private schools 
are horizontally constrained in that they arise in villages where there is a pool of secondary-
educated women. They are also vertically constrained in that they are unlikely to cater to the 
secondary levels in rural areas, at least until there is an increase in the supply of potential 
teachers with the required skills and educational levels. 
 
 
 
 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4066, November 2006 
 
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the 
exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, 
even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should 
be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely 
those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, 
or the countries they represent. Policy Research Working Papers are available online at 
http://econ.worldbank.org. 
                                                 
1 Corresponding author: Tahir Andrabi (tandrabi@pomona.edu). We thank Mehnaz Akber for early 
discussions and Safi Qureshey Foundation for initial financial support. We thank Tara Vishwanath, 
Michelle Riboud, Harold Alderman and Elizabeth M. King for useful comments. This research was funded 
by grants from the Poverty and Social Impact Analysis and Knowledge for Change Program Trust Funds 
and the South Asia region of the World Bank. 
WPS4066
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
 2
Introduction 
The 2000 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) created a powerful global consensus to 
improve the development of poor countries by 2015. Central to this promise are the MDGs 
related to educational outcomes: (1) Ensure that all children complete primary education by 2015. 
(2) Eliminate gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2005. By 2006, most 
countries have already fallen well behind the necessary targets to meet these goals. These 
worrying trends led to renewed calls for greater public investment in schools through school 
construction, teacher training programs and cash transfers for children. Notably absent in the 
proposals has been any role for private schools. 2 
 
One reason why private schools have never been seen or used as an instrument for mass 
education is that they typically serve the elite.  In the US, 4 percent of low-income families send 
their children to private schools compared to 19 percent among the rich. Of parents with less than 
high school education, only 3 percent send their children to private schools compared to 19 
percent for parents with graduate or professional degrees.3 Moreover, the share of private 
schooling is higher in tertiary and secondary education compared to primary education, by which 
time a large share of children from poor families have dropped out. These patterns are not unique 
to the US.  The share of private schooling is higher in secondary compared to primary education 
in the majority of countries worldwide; in others the difference is fairly low and usually 
associated with the high state funding of private schools (Belgium, Spain, Netherlands and Chile 
are four such examples).4 
 
In contrast, South Asian countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh and India all show high shares of 
private enrollment at the primary level. Countries such as Zimbabwe in Sub-Saharan Africa as 
well as Lebanon and the gulf-states in the Middle East also stand out, with both high private 
school enrollment and a larger private sector share at the primary level.  
 
We focus our attention on Pakistan, a country that is severely off-track in achieving the MDGs  
and where the role of private schools is strongly debated in academic, popular and policy 
writings.5 A substantial part of this debate is framed in terms of the “rising fees” and limited 
access to these schools in rural areas,  concerns strongly voiced in the government’s recent policy 
statement on private schools: 
                                                 
2 The United Nations (2005) 
3 NCES (1995), Table 1.5 
4 Based on the World Bank’s Edstats database, available at http://www1.worldbank.org/education/edstats/  
5 See Rahman (2005) and Abbas (2006)  
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“It is argued that because of immense resource requirement, it is difficult for the 
government to achieve the objective of universalization of primary education. 
Accordingly, the opening of primary schools in the private sector is considered 
additionally to the effort of the government towards universalization. This is not a 
legitimate argument. The participation rates being already higher in urban settlements, it 
is in the rural areas that more schools are needed. The type of clientele going to these 
schools would any way participate in education. Thus, their role in universalization 
remains only marginal. Furthermore, because of the use of English as a medium of 
instruction, and high fee structure, these institutions are best suited to serve the 
requirement of elite population. Such a development is contradicted if effort is to be 
directed towards the development of an egalitarian society.”6 
 
A specific picture of the private sector is painted whereby (a) private schools charge high fees; (b) 
private schools locate typically in urban areas and (c) private schools cater to an “elite 
population”. Neither this debate nor this characterization is unique to Pakistan. 7 
 
Using newly available data we present a starkly different picture of private schooling in Pakistan.  
There was a phenomenal rise in the share of the private sector in educational provision during the 
1990s and an increasing segment of children enrolled in private schools are from rural areas and 
from middle-class and poorer families. We submit that private schools are better able to adapt to 
local conditions and use local labor markets in a cost-effective manner, allowing the savings to be 
passed on to parents through very low fees. The median fee of a rural private school in Pakistan is 
less than a dime a day (Rs.6 per day, or Rs.120 per month). If replicable in other countries, the 
results suggest that separating the financing of education (the government) from the provision of 
education (through the private sector) will have large gains, without necessarily sacrificing 
equity.8  
 
Two considerations drive our focus on Pakistan. First, the extent of private schooling in Pakistan 
is striking.  In 2000, 35 percent of children enrolled in school at the primary level were in private 
schools, and this number falls by a third for middle and high schools to 25 percent. Private 
schooling in Pakistan at the primary level is large, widespread and increasing over time. Second, 
                                                 
6See Ministry of Education (2006) 
7 See The Bangladesh Observer (2004). 
8 In the broader South-Asian context, Kingdon (1996 and 1998) first looked at private schools in the Indian 
context, where the private sector accounts for 15 percent of all enrollments; more recent contributions 
include Bajpai, Dholakia and Sachs (2005). The proliferation and nature of private schools in India appears 
to be similar to that in Pakistan. For in stance, Tooley (2001, pg.13) observes: 
“Any visitor to the ‘slums’ of any of the big cities in India will be struck by the sheer number of private 
schools—there seems to be one on almost every street corner or down every alleyway. Some of these 
confusingly follow what they see as an English tradition and call themselves public schools but they are 
wholly private in every way and are certainly not elite institutions.” 
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Pakistan is the only low-income country, to our knowledge, that has a high quality census of all 
private schooling facilities in the country. These data allow us to understand the structure of 
private schools throughout the country; the large sample size permits useful comparisons even in 
regions where the extent of private schooling is smaller. Using this census of private schools in 
addition to representative household surveys from 1991 and 2001 and data collected by the 
authors, we document several patterns about the private schooling phenomenon in the country. 
 
• The growth in private schooling is higher in rural compared to urban areas and is high 
even among the poorest segments of the population. What is equally remarkable is that 
these schools are overwhelmingly for-profit enterprises—they have sprung up around the 
country without much state regulation or subsidy. 9   
• Private schools charge (very) low fees. A typical private school in a rural village of 
Pakistan charges Rs.1000 ($18) per year, which represents 4 percent of the GDP per 
capita for the country. In the US, private schools (elementary and secondary) charged 
$3524 in 1991. At 14 percent of GDP per capita, the relative cost of private schooling is 
almost 3.5 times as high in the US compared to Pakistan.10 
• The key to charging low fees is keeping costs down. Since teachers’ salaries constitute 
the bulk of educational budgets around the world, lowering wages significantly reduces 
the overall cost of providing education. Private schools employ young, single, moderately 
educated and untrained local women. Since alternative employment opportunities for 
these women are limited, they are paid considerably lower wages than their male 
counterparts. 
• These mechanisms define the possibility of private schools as well as their limits. Where 
private schools arise, the use of locally educated women and the structure of the labor 
market allow them to charge low fees. Where they exist, they are affordable. However, 
private schools do not exist everywhere; in particular they are constrained by the 
availability of teachers and potential demand side considerations reflecting the size of the 
village. Private schools are therefore not accessible to all. Since available teachers in 
rural areas are typically (just) secondary-educated, privates schools are also by necessity 
limited to the primary schooling market. It is unlikely that private schools will cater to the 
                                                 
9 Private schools are secular schools, the majority of whom do not receive any funding from either the 
government or private agencies. A recent study by the authors (Andrabi and others 2005a) shows that 
religious schools play a much smaller role in Pakistan than believed. The share of religious schooling is 
less than one percent, lower than enrollment in religious institutions in the US. Most private schools in 
Pakistan do not receive any external funding, which makes them equivalent to the private unaided schools 
in India, for instance. This is in sharp contrast to (say) Indonesia, where private schools receive significant 
subsidies from the government (James, King and Suryadi 1996). 
10 National Council on Educational Statistics (1995) Table 1.5.  
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secondary or tertiary sector, at least until a cohort of college-educated teachers is 
available locally. 
 
Understanding the evolution of the private sector for education in Pakistan has wider 
implications. Governments in low-income countries around the world are struggling to meet the 
educational demands of an ever increasing young population. In Pakistan half the population is 
less than 17 years old and this proportion is increasing. With less than 60 percent of children 
enrolled in school, there are already signs of stress. Mean student-teacher ratios in government 
schools exceed 35 and have been rising. School construction has slowed down and less than half 
of all classrooms have desks for their children. Private schools can play a role in breaking these 
institutional constraints, and the Pakistani experience demonstrates that they can do so without 
catering only to the elite.  
 
The remainder of this paper develops the ideas advanced here. In Section II we describe our data 
sources. Section III examines the growth of private schooling in Pakistan. Section IV takes a 
closer look at how private schools operate. We document fees and costs for private schools and 
examine teacher profiles and wage differentials between public and private schools. Section V 
concludes with a discussion of educational policy, caveats and future research in this area. 
 
Section II. The Country Context and the Data 
Pakistan has 132 million people and is organized in a federal structure with four main 
provinces—Punjab, Sindh, North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan. These 
four provinces, along with Islamabad, the federal capital, comprise 97 percent of the country’s 
population. Punjab is the largest province with 56 percent of the population and Sindh, NWFP 
and Balochistan account for 23 percent, 13 percent and 5 percent respectively. There are other 
regions and territories where special constitutional and legal qualifications apply. The Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) with 3 percent of the population has representation in the 
national assembly but national laws apply only partially. The Northern Areas and Azad Jammu 
and Kashmir (AJK) enjoy special status and their population is not counted in population census 
numbers. Provinces manage the provision of education, although there are recent changes at the 
local government level that aim to devolve provision to the numerous districts within every 
province. 
 
Educational performance is poor both in absolute terms and relative to the average income of the 
country. Pakistan has an adult literacy rate of 44 percent compared to 54 percent for the South 
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Asia average, and in 2001-02, net-enrollment was 51 percent compared to 83 percent for India, 90 
percent for Sri-Lanka and 70 percent for Nepal. For the country’s level of income, the forecasted 
net enrollment rate (based on a regression of primary net enrollment on log per-capita income and 
the square of log per-capital income for 138 countries) is 77 percent: Pakistan’s net enrollment is 
thus far below what one would expect for its level of income. 
 
The problem of low overall educational performance is further compounded by large gender, 
income and geographical disparities. There is a 20 percentage point difference in gross enrollment 
rates at the primary level between boys and girls and in some provinces, notably NWFP and 
Balochistan, this difference increases to 40 percentage points (PIHS 2001-02). Wealth also 
matters: at the primary level gross enrollment rates for the top expenditure-decile is twice as high 
as for the lowest decile. Finally, the rural-urban divide is large with a net-enrollment ratio of 45 
percent in rural areas compared to 66 percent for the urban areas. Net-enrollment ratios for rural 
females, at 36 percent, are therefore the lowest for any sub-group of the population. 
 
Private education in Pakistan has a long history dating back to before independence in 1947. 
Limited data suggest that private schools catered to a niche market restricted to big cities from 
1947-1972, dominated by missionary-run schools or local schools imitating the missionary 
model, and were mainly used by the elite. In 1972 private schools were nationalized amidst a 
government program of nationalization of all industry. The policy was reversed in 1979 through a 
process of denationalization. Private schools were allowed to open and the schools taken over by 
the government were gradually returned to the original owners. However, government policy 
towards private schools was and still is one of laissez faire—there are no subsidies in the form of 
grants to parents or schools (as in Bangladesh, the Philippines or India) so that private schools 
arise and survive purely as a market based phenomenon.  
 
The Data 
We employ four primary government data sources and data from a comprehensive education 
survey on Learning and Educational Achievement in Punjab Schools (henceforth LEAPS), 
collected by the authors. Our government sources are the 1998 Population Census, the Punjab 
Educational Management Information Systems, the Census of Private Educational Institutions in 
Pakistan (PEIP), and the Pakistan Integrated Household Surveys (PIHS). In brief, the Population 
Census is the decennial census conducted by the Population Census Organization provides 
information on village level attributes for every village in Pakistan. The census of private 
educational institutions was conducted by the Federal Bureau of Statistics in 2000 and provides 
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information on all private schools in the country at that time. The Educational Management 
Information Systems (EMIS) is collected by the provincial Education departments and provides 
information on public schools; due to data limitations we use the EMIS for Punjab province only 
(more on this below). Finally, the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (PIHS) conducted also 
by the Federal Bureau of Statistics is a nationally representative household survey carried out in 
1991, 1998 and 2001. We use the 1991 and 2001 rounds to examine the growth of private 
schooling across provinces, the rural/urban divide and across income groups, and the 1998 round 
to look at enrollment differences between the rich and the poor in villages with and without 
private schools.11  
 
These data were linked through an extensive matching process so that we could examine school-
level attributes in conjunction with village-level data such as population and village 
infrastructure. There was a 100 percent match between the population census, the census of 
private schools and the PIHS since these were collected by the same agency. The EMIS data was 
collected by the provincial government and had a different coding scheme. To match these data at 
the village-level we used text-matching algorithms followed by a manual match. This process 
allowed us to match 85 percent of the schools in the EMIS database with the census; for these 
villages, we then have complete data on both village-characteristics and the existence of public 
and private schools.12  
 
In addition to these government data sources, data on teachers’ profiles and wages were collected 
in 2004 as part of an ongoing project—Learning and Educational Achievement in Punjab Schools 
(LEAPS). A unique characteristic of this data is the sampling frame, which was constructed in 
two stages. In the first stage we stratified the province of Punjab in three regions—North, Central 
and South—and chose one district from each region.13 In the second stage, villages were chosen 
randomly in each of these districts from a list frame of villages with at least one private school. 
The sampling-frame allows us to examine variation in teacher’s wages across public and private 
schools in the same village, thus abstracting from differences due to geography, labor market 
segmentation or other village specific features. Across the three districts, our sample consists of 
4,880 teachers interviewed in 800 public and private schools in 112 villages.  
                                                 
11 In order to do so, we need the names of villages where the surveys were conducted. We have access to 
the list of villages for 1998, but not 2001. 
12 The problem is somewhat complicated since there is no standardization of transliteration of village 
names into English. The same village names can be spelled quite differently in the two data sets. 
13 The choice of one district each from North, Central and South Punjab follows an accepted stratification 
in the Province, where the Southern districts are typically thought to be the least developed followed by the 
center. 
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Section III. The Rise of Private Schooling 
Based on a school mapping exercise conducted in 1983, Jimenez and Tan (1985, 1987) noted a 
large increase in the number of private schools after denationalization, leading to substantial cost 
savings for the government in the provision of education. The authors noted (cautioning that the 
available data did not allow for an unambiguous statement) that despite the growth in private 
schools, educational institutions still did not service large proportions of the country’s population; 
particularly troublesome was the exclusion of girls in rural areas. Based on tuition and other fees 
in private schools, they argued that private schools were catering only to the rich and concluded 
that the private education sector would reach “full-capacity” at an enrollment of 2.1 million 
children.  
 
Fifteen years after Jimenez and Tan’s (1987) assessment, there are 6.3 million children enrolled in 
more than 36,000 private institutions in Pakistan.  From the 3,300 private schools in the four big 
provinces (Punjab, Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan) in 1983, there were 32,000 such schools in the 
same four provinces in 2000—an almost ten-fold increase in less than two decades.  Enrollment 
in these private schools is mostly at the primary level, accounting for 75 percent of the total 
enrollment in private schools. As a share of total enrollment, 18 percent of children in the 5-10 
age-groups, 9 percent of the 11-13 age-group and 4 percent of the 14-16 age-group was attending 
private schools. Since a large fraction of children of all age groups are not enrolled in any type of 
school, private school enrollments account for 35 percent of public enrollment across primary, 
middle and high schools.  
 
The boom in private schools happened during the 1990s (Figure 1). The median year of formation 
for a private school that was functional in 2000 is 1996; 22 percent of schools in 2000 were 
formed in 1998 and 50 percent were less than 4 years old (formed on or after 1996). 14 While the 
majority of existing schools formed before 1990 were urban, since then there has been a 
qualitative shift with a steady increase in the rural/urban ratio till 1996, followed by a leveling 
                                                 
14 Interpreting these figures as the growth-rate of private schools in recent years is problematic since data 
on the age of schools currently existing does not yield information about school survival rate. If, over a 3-
year span, 1000 schools were set up each year but 500 shut down a year later, a survey after three years 
would report 125 schools aged 3 years, 250 schools aged 2 years, 500 schools aged 1 year and 1000 schools 
established in the current year. The difference in these numbers is due to the school survival rate rather than 
the growth of schools. To some extent we can separate the joint effect of school formation and school 
survival rates through a simple exercise based on data from 1983: In 1983, there were 3300 private schools 
in the four provinces. In contrast, the current census indicates that by 2000 there were 1,764 private schools 
formed in 1983 or before in these provinces, suggesting that a bit over half the schools survived over the 
17-year period i.e. an implied annual survival rate of 96.4%. Discounting the numbers that Figure 2 is 
based on by the survival rate still yields substantial growth in private schools during the 90s. 
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off.  Since 1996 onwards, an equal number of private schools were set up in rural and urban areas 
every year and in 1999, there were 8,000 new private schools setup in Pakistan, almost half of 
which were in rural areas.  
 
The dramatic increase in the setting up of private schools translated directly into a greater 
enrollment share for the private sector. All four main provinces registered consistent increases in 
the share of private schooling in total enrollment between 1991 and 2001, although their specific 
experiences varied: the largest increases were in Punjab and NWFP (from 15 to 30 percent and 4 
to 17 percent respectively) while the growth in Sindh (16 to 21 percent) and Balochistan (4 to 6 
percent) was more muted.15  
 
The enrollment share of the private sector increased both in urban and rural areas, and for both 
the rich and the poor. Between 1991 and 2001, for the poorest decile of per-capita expenditure in 
rural areas, the share of private schools increased from 0 to 6 percent; for the richest rural deciles 
the share jumped from 12 to 38 percent. Urban areas reported equally high growths, although 
from a higher initial level. For the poorest deciles, the equivalent increase was from 9 to 18 
percent and for the richest from 52 to 85 percent. By the end of the nineties, nearly all rich 
Pakistani children in urban areas, almost a third of the richer rural children and close to 10 
percent of children in the poorest deciles nationally were studying in private schools. 
 
Figure 2 examines this change using growth enrollment curves. We computed the growth in 
private and public enrollment for every decile based on household consumption expenditure data 
from the PIHS in 1991 and 2001. The horizontal axis in the figure shows the relevant decile in 
1991 and 2001 where 1 is the poorest and 10 the richest. The vertical axis shows the growth in 
enrollment, defined as ((Enrollment2001 – Enrollment1991)/Enrollment1991) for the relevant decile. 
Nationally, decadal enrollment growth rates in the private sector were higher among the poor 
(close to 300 percent) and lower among the rich (150 percent) and middle-income groups in rural 
areas registered the highest growth rates (close to 400 percent). There was a decline in public 
school enrollment growth rates, both across urban and rural areas and across the rich and the 
poor, although these declines were more marked for the rich. 
 
The 1990s saw the single biggest shift in the structure of educational delivery in Pakistan and 
contrary to popular belief, religious schooling played no role in this structural shift. Secular 
                                                 
15 All enrollment comparisons between 1991 and 2001 are based on enrollment and household consumption 
expenditure data from the PIHS in 1991 and 2001. 
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private schools gained significantly in the share of overall primary enrollment and their gains 
were across all provinces, across rural and urban areas and for both the rich and the poor. 
Nevertheless, towards the end of the 1990s, there were still large areas of the country, such as 
rural Balochistan and Sindh, where private schools had not made any inroads. This uneven spread 
of private schools allows us to better understand the causes of their spectacular growth as well as 
its limitations. 
 
Section IV. The Private Schooling Story 
Seven figures and tables illustrate different facets of the private schooling story; together they 
present a landscape where (a) educational outcomes are closely linked to the presence of a private 
school and (b) the presence of a private school relies critically on the availability of educated 
women in the village. A key message emerges: where private schools arise, they are affordable 
and used by the poor, but private schools do not arise everywhere. Indeed, the same mechanism 
that ensures their affordability also constrains where they locate. 
 
Schooling Outcomes in Villages with and without Private Schools 
The first table shows differences between villages with and without private schools in schooling 
outcomes and the relative use of private schools by the rich and the poor using matched data from 
the census of private schooling (PEIP, 2000) and the Pakistan integrated household survey (PIHS, 
1998). We present results for the country as a whole (Column 1, Table 1) and the four main 
provinces separately (Columns 2-5, Table 1). Several features of this comparison are noteworthy. 
 
As expected, private school enrollment is higher in villages with private schools, and in both 
villages with and without private schools the rich use private schools more than the poor (note 
that even in villages without private schools, some parents send their children to private schools 
outside the village). In all four provinces, the share of private enrollment is twice as high in 
villages with private schools compared to those without: in Punjab, for instance, in villages with 
private schools, 23 percent of enrollment is in private schools compared to 11 percent in villages 
without. For the four main provinces, the share of private schooling among the rich is double that 
of the poor in villages with private schools, and almost four times as high in villages without. The 
pattern repeats across all four provinces, with the exception of Balochistan, where the size of the 
sample is too small for meaningful comparisons.  
 
However, the use of private schools by the poor has as much to do with their availability as their 
costs conditional on location. Where there are private schools in the village, a sizeable fraction of 
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the poor use them: in Punjab, in villages with private schools, the share of private schooling in 
total enrollment for the poorest one-third is 15 percent and among the richest one-third 29 
percent. Remarkably, for the country as a whole, the fraction of private enrollment for the poor in 
villages where there are private schools (13 percent) is greater than the share of private 
enrollment (11 percent) for the rich in villages where there are none.  
 
Finally, the existence of private schools is strongly associated with greater female education. In 
both Punjab and NWFP, there is a large and significant difference of close to 20 percentage 
points in overall female enrollment in villages with private schools compared to those without. 
Comparisons of the gender-ratio in private and public schools show that a dramatic impact of the 
penetration of private schools is that there is a smaller gender gap in private school enrollment 
across the country—the share of female enrollment in private schools is consistently 3-5 
percentage points higher than in government schools in educational data from all available 
sources.16  
 
The LEAPS data provide further evidence on the association between enrollment and the 
presence of private schools by looking “inside” villages and contrasting enrollment patterns in 
settlements with and without private schools.17 Figure 3 shows male and female enrollment in 
settlements with and without private schools for the 112 villages in the survey. There is a 21 
percentage point increase in male enrollment and a 29 percentage point increase for female 
enrollment (which is lower in every category) in settlements with private schools compared to 
those without and a 29 percentage point increase for female enrollment. 
  
Table 2 looks at the association of school-presence and enrollment in a multivariate regression 
context. The first two columns presents differences between households located in settlements 
with and without private schools; the first column is a cross-section regression while the second 
introduces village-level fixed effects. As expected, enrollment increases sharply with age but the 
increases taper off as the child becomes older (the negative coefficient on the square term in age). 
Also as expected, the income and education of the household significantly increase enrollment 
levels for children. 
 
                                                 
16 The difference using the PEIP census and EMIS numbers is 37 percent vs. 42 percent in 1999-00 and 40 
percent vs. 44 percent in PIHS 2000 data. 
17 Using geographical markers, we divided every village into “settlements”; for the sample of 112 villages, 
there are 215 settlements. 
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Of particular interest are the effects on enrollment of being female, of having a private school in 
the settlement and the differential effect of being a female in a settlement with a private school, 
which is captured by the interaction term. The presence of a private school in the settlement 
significantly increases enrollments for boys by 16.4 percentage points, but has a much larger 
effect on girls given by the additional interaction term of 8.1 percentage points. Put another way, 
in settlements without private schools, females are 16 percentage points less likely to be enrolled 
compared to boys. When there are private schools in the settlement, the enrollment of both 
genders increases, but female enrollment increases more so that the overall gender gap decreases 
to 8 percentage points.  
 
Following Jacoby and Mansuri (2006), the next column (Column 3, Table 2) repeats the same 
regression with household fixed-effects. That is, we look at the differential effect of school-
presence across girls and boys in the same household—doing so allows us to identify the 
differential effect of school-presence across genders while controlling for unobserved household-
level omitted variables (for instance, households that care less about schooling may be located in 
settlements without schools). The gender penalty of school-presence is strong and significant: 
compared to a boy in the same household, a girl in a settlement without a private school is 18 
percentage points less likely to be enrolled but this gap decreases to 9 percentage points in 
settlement with such schooling options. Private schools increase enrollments, more so for girls 
than boys and where they exist they are also used by the poor. The key to the use of private 
schools by the poor lies in their affordability.18 
 
Private School Fees 
Earlier studies in smaller samples had shown that private schools charged very low fees. 
Alderman and others (2001) for instance, document that private school fees are affordable even 
for the poor in urban cities of Quetta and Lahore, charging an average of Rs.85/month in their 
                                                 
18 These results contrast with the discussion in Lloyd, Meta and Grant (2006), who argue that private 
schools do not increase girls’ enrollment, but locate where girls’ enrollment was high to begin with. There 
are several problems with their interpretation. The evidence that private schools do not lead to higher girls’ 
enrollment is drawn from 12 villages, of which only 5 do not have a private school in the second wave of 
their survey. They find no contemporaneous difference in female enrollments between the villages with and 
without private schools, which is not consistent with the nationally representative data in Table 1. In their 
randomized treatment-control study, Alderman and others (2001) shows that the setting up of a private 
school leads to a 20 percentage point increase in female enrollment, which is very close to the numbers in 
Table 1. The argument that private schools locate in villages with higher girls’ enrollment does not hold in 
larger samples either. Table 7 below will look at private school locations in villages with girls’ primary 
schools and with girls’ primary and secondary schools based on data from 26000 villages in Punjab 
province. We will argue that only the second type of school increases the likelihood of private school 
existence in the village. This has more to do with the availability of teachers than students, particularly 
since 90 percent of private schools in rural areas cater only to the primary sections.  
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study. We bring country-wide data to show that fees are low for all the provinces in Pakistan, as 
well as for rural and urban regions within each province.  
 
Table 3 shows median and mean fees for private schools in the four main provinces using data 
from the census of private schools.19 Median school fees in Pakistan are low: the highest median 
school fee in urban and rural areas is Rs.1757 and Rs.1265 annually, both for the province of 
Balochistan. Punjab, with more than 50 percent of the school going age population reports the 
lowest median annual fees in urban and rural regions (Rs.828 and Rs.600 respectively). In rural 
areas, the median annual fee translates to roughly 80 cents a month, or a nickel a day. Based on 
expenditure data from the PIHS, the mean tuition fee in Punjab represents 1.7 percent of average 
household expenditure in rural and 2.1 percent in urban areas.  A family with 4 children in an 
urban area will spend 8.4 percent of their household budget on school tuition fees if all their 
children are enrolled in an average private school.20 The consistently higher mean compared to 
the median shows that the distribution is skewed to the left, with a high concentration of schools 
around lower school fees. The maximum inter-quartile range, which shows the range of fees 
between the schools at the 75th and 25th percentiles of the fee distribution, is Rs.1200 (urban 
Balochistan): in rural regions, 50 percent of all schools are concentrated in a tight band ranging 
from Rs.900 to Rs.1500. 
 
A striking aspect of Table 3 is that provinces with more schools report lower median fees. If 
private schools respond to higher local demand for quality education, we expect the opposite 
relationship to hold—private schools arise where people are willing to pay more for education; 
therefore, the extent of private schooling should be positively correlated with fees. The data is 
more consistent with the hypothesis that the existence of private schools is constrained not by the 
demand for such schooling, but by the availability of teachers. Private schools arise where 
teachers are available. Since the presence of private schools is a response to an increase in supply, 
fees are lower in areas where their penetration is higher.  
 
Teachers (and Their Wages) in Private Schools 
Table 4 is a first look at the importance of teachers in the private schooling story. The first row in 
the table compares salaries in the private and public sector using data on 4,890 teachers in the 800 
public and private schools of the LEAPS study. The difference in pay between a teacher in a 
                                                 
19 We eliminate a small number of NGO schools that are subsidized by donors and may charge lower fees. 
20 Note that total expenditure in schooling includes more than just tuition fees and these numbers therefore 
represent an underestimate of the total costs of schooling. 
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private and a government school is staggering. An average female teacher in a government school 
earns Rs.5897 per month, which is not very different from the earnings for an average male 
(Rs.6408). Among private schools though, male teachers earn Rs.1789 per month (almost one-
third!) while females earn only half as much at Rs.1069.  
 
Two factors drive these salary differences between the public and private sectors: (a) differences 
in teacher characteristics and; (b) differences in the returns to characteristics. Teacher 
characteristics in the public and private sector are clearly very different (Table 4). Private schools 
hire female teachers (76 percent  compared to 43 percent in government schools) who are 
substantially younger (25 years versus 38 years for public school teachers), less likely to be 
married (77 percent are single versus 15 percent), twice as likely to come from the village where 
they are teaching (52 percent versus 25 percent), less educated (4 percent have a masters degree 
compared to 19 percent) and far less likely to have received any educational training (6 percent 
versus 71 percent). 
 
The returns to characteristics are also different. Table 5 presents multivariate regressions of (log) 
teacher wages on observed characteristics including age, education, teacher-training, gender and 
place of residence (whether local or not). The first two columns show how different 
characteristics are compensated by public and private schools respectively, while the third 
column examines differences between public and private school compensation through 
interaction terms. Since the LEAPS data is based on a sampling scheme that guarantees multiple 
schools in every village, we can also look at the difference among teachers in the same village; 
the fourth column looks at differences within villages through a fixed-effect regression at the 
level of the village. 
 
Salaries for public school teachers respond strongly to education and training but not to the 
gender of the teacher. Private sector salaries also respond to education, but not to teacher-training 
and females are paid considerably less. Surprisingly, there are few differences in the estimated 
coefficients in specifications with and without geographical controls (Column 3 vs. Column 4, 
Table 5). Using these regressions for the public and private sectors, Figures 4 and 5 highlight the 
separate roles of characteristics and returns to characteristics.  
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Figure 4 illustrates the thought experiment of moving a teacher from the public sector and paying 
her/him the salary that would be associated with her characteristics in the private sector. That is, 
we use the estimated coefficients from Column 1 in Table 5 to predict what private sector salaries 
would be for teachers with characteristics observed in the public sector. The figure plots the 
average pay of a teacher in the public sector (the first bar), a teacher in the private sector (the 
second bar) and a teacher in the private sector if he/she had the same characteristics as teachers 
in the public sector. The difference between the first and the third bar is the difference in salaries 
arising from differential returns in the two sectors; the difference between the second and the 
third bar is the difference due to characteristics.  
 
There is a dramatic decrease in the public sector teacher’s salary if she were to move to the 
private sector. The average salary for the public sector teacher falls from Rs.5620 to Rs.1765. 
This is because the private sector does not value teacher training (which the public sector does), it 
does not compensate experience to the same level as the public sector, and it pays female teachers 
a lot less. The remaining difference with the average salary in the private sector, Rs.1084 vs. Rs. 
1765, is because of differences in teacher characteristics. Public sector teachers are more 
educated and this is reflected in their higher wages. 21 
 
Figure 5 looks at differences in returns for the private and public sector for three particular 
characteristics—teacher gender, origin and training. The horizontal axis shows the salary penalty 
(negative) or premium (positive) associated with these characteristics in the two sectors. After 
controlling for observed characteristics, female teachers earn slightly more (not significant) in the 
government sector but 33 percent less in the private sector. In both sectors local teachers are paid 
less, but the penalty in the private sector (23 percent) is much larger than in the government 
sector (6 percent). Finally, the public sector cares a lot about teacher training while the private 
sector does not. Teachers with a Primary Teacher Certificate (PTC) earn 75 percent more in the 
public sector and only 3 percent more (not significant) in the private sector. 
 
                                                 
21 This is the familiar Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition in the labor economics literature. As is well 
understood, choosing the correct reference group affects the interpretation of the decomposition. If we 
perform the reverse experiment of moving a private sector teacher to the public sector, her salary would 
increase from Rs.1084 to Rs.1895, primarily because the public sector values teacher-training and most 
private sector teachers are not trained. An alternative is to use the pooled data as the reference group, where 
as expected, the estimates are in between the two experiments discussed here. 
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The critical insight is that by basing hiring decisions and linking pay closely to local labor market 
conditions private schools have kept their costs low. Compensation in the government and private 
sector works in very different ways: teachers in the government sector are paid on the basis of a 
pay-scale that rewards experience and training, but does not respond to local labor market 
conditions. In contrast, the private sector values teacher education, but also compensates teachers 
according to their other available opportunities in the labor market. With fewer occupational 
opportunities women are restricted to the village in their job-search so they are paid less. 22 
Bringing a teacher from outside the village means that the school has to pay more for travel, so 
non-local teachers are paid more. It is also interesting to speculate on why the market does not 
value teacher-training. In related work we show that there is no relationship between teacher 
training and either teacher competency or their children’s academic performance. A recent report 
confirms that training programs are in crisis and add little to the teachers’ efficacy (Ali Institute 
2005). A striking, but perhaps valid, hypothesis is that the market does not value training because 
training does not add any value. There are thus two steps that account for the success of the 
private educational sector in Pakistan: 
• Hire teachers whose characteristics do not command high salaries in the labor market. 
Private school teachers are overwhelmingly women and are less educated than in the 
public sector; if private school teachers had the same characteristics as those in the public 
sector, the market would reward them with a 63 percent increase in salaries (instead of 
the 518 percent that teachers in public schools currently enjoy). 
• React optimally to local labor market conditions. Women and local teachers are paid less 
in the private sector, but not in the public sector. 
  
Where have private schools located? 
The very factors that explain the success of private schools also embed their potential limitations. 
Private schools need a large number of children in the catchment population and they need a pool 
of potential teachers with a certain demographic profile (local women with secondary education). 
A matched database that combines village characteristics and private school existence allows us 
to examine village-level variables that increase the likelihood of a private school.  
 
                                                 
22 The data from the LEAPS survey is corroborated by data from the wider labor market beyond that of 
teachers. Wage differences between men and women in Pakistan are staggering. Analysis based on 
household surveys show that men receive four times as much as women when they have primary education 
and two times as much when they have secondary education (World Bank 2005). That educated women 
cost less is in large part due to different constraints on labor mobility of men and women. While men can 
(and often do) travel outside their residential areas to pursue employment opportunities, cultural constraints 
and issues of safety restrict work options for women to the settlement that they live in (World Bank 2005). 
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Private schools locate in villages with larger populations and better infrastructure across the four 
provinces (Table 6). Villages where there are private schools are roughly twice as large in terms 
of population (4465) than those without (1502).  Private schools are also in villages where 
infrastructure is better. Across all four main provinces, 73 percent of houses report an electricity 
connection in villages where there are private schools compared to 44 percent in villages where 
they are not. The same pattern repeats for piped water supply. The average fraction of houses 
with permanent construction (a plausible measure of village wealth is the fraction of houses with 
pakka (permanent) construction rather than mud or thatch) in a village with private school is 60 
percent compared to 36 percent in villages without private schools.  
 
However, village size and wealth are not the unique determinants of private school location. 
Private schools also tend to locate in villages where there are women with secondary education. 
In the case of Punjab, increasing the percentage of educated (older) females in the village by one 
standard deviation increases the number of private schools in a village by 0.51 standard 
deviations. More compellingly, the likelihood of having a private school in a village more than 
doubles when a village has a girls public secondary school (compared to a village that does not 
have a girls’ school), increasing from 11.6 percent to 30.79 percent, but is no different when the 
village has only a girls’ primary school (Table 7). In Andrabi, Das and Khwaja (2006) we tested 
this prediction using an instrumental variables strategy and confirmed that the prior construction 
of a girls’ public secondary school increases the likelihood of a private school by almost three 
times and furthermore, such construction is associated with a decline in teachers’ wages in private 
schools. Private schools have overwhelmingly located where the government set up girls’ 
secondary schools in the last twenty years.  
 
Section V. Discussion and Caveats 
Private schools have effectively used less educated, low paid young women to serve as primary 
grade teachers. This formula for success may not be replicable at the secondary and the higher-
secondary level, since the required skill and educational levels are just not locally available in 
most of rural Pakistan. To expand to this level, private schools will be forced to hire teachers 
from outside the village, dramatically increasing salary costs. Thus the affordability of private 
schools stemming from the low labor costs will be compromised.  The spread of private schools, 
therefore, is constrained both geographically—they will first come up in villages where there is a 
ready stock of educated women—and vertically by the availability of trained teachers at the local 
level. 
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The debate between private and public schooling focuses on substitution between private and 
public enrollment, where increasing enrollments in one is seen as the decline in the share of the 
other. While the two are indeed alternate sources of education and hence substitutes at any given 
time, the success of private schools in Pakistan is based on their overwhelming reliance on locally 
based teachers who are female. But where do these locally based females with secondary 
education come from in the first place? Pakistan’s case adds a temporal dimension to the debate 
on public versus private schooling, introducing complementarities between the two sectors. Girls 
educated in today’s public schools will become teachers in tomorrow’s private schools. Viewed 
in this light, a first priority should be the development of a cohort of educated women in every 
village who can then serve as catalysts in the process of educational reform. Dynamic 
complementarities between the public and private sector suggest that a first large investment, a 
“Big Push” in creating cohorts of educated women could then lead to self-sustaining growth in 
educational provision through the use of private schools. Alternatively, to alleviate the constraints 
of low cost teachers, it has to become easier for women from the outside to break into the village 
labor market.  Educational policy in Pakistan needs to take into account the segmented nature of 
labor markets and the dynamic complementarities that exists between public and private schools.  
 
Our focus on the supply constraints to education and the central role of women as teachers is not 
new. In the US there has been an extensive debate about the relationship between changing 
educational quality and the exit of women from the teaching profession. Two reasons—the 
opening up of alternative employment options and increased unionization—have been advanced 
as potential explanations for this compositional change in the teaching workforce. As the labor 
force participation of women in Pakistan increases, it is likely that similar patterns will emerge. 
Pakistan at this stage presents a fascinating glimpse of an environment that many higher-income 
countries witnessed 50 years ago. 
 
There are important aspects of private schools that we have not touched on here. For instance, 
more than 92 percent of private schools in both rural and urban areas of Pakistan are co-
educational. They are co-educational not only in the less conservative provinces such as Punjab 
(94 percent), but also in provinces with lower human-development indicators and typically more 
conservative attitudes, such as NWFP (88 percent) and Sindh (90 percent). A common wisdom in 
Pakistan is that girls will not go to school unless schools are single-sex. As Gazdar (2001) points 
out, this wisdom is not borne out by attitudinal surveys of parents towards primary schooling or 
systematic evidence from any part of the country. In fact, in certain cases, a large number of girls 
have started attending boys’ primary schools when allowed to do so—distance seems to be a 
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larger factor for non-enrollment in primary schools, rather than the presence (or not) of a 
segregated school (Holmes 2003, Lloyd, Mete, and Sathar 2005a, Alderman, Orazem and Paterno 
2001). The advantages and experience with co-education and whether female teachers help attract 
girls to school is a critical issue for the development of private schools and for education in the 
country. 
 
There are also certain questions left unanswered in our paper. To the extent that private schools 
save on costs by hiring local, female and moderately qualified teachers, are they compromising 
on quality? Figure 6 is a preliminary response to this concern. Here we plot teacher absenteeism 
for government and private schools separately for male and female teachers.23 Private school 
teachers are considerably less absent than government school teachers in a given month. 
Government school female teachers are absent more than twice as many days (4 vs. 1.8) in a 
month than their private school counterparts. So, if what really matters for primary schooling is 
that the teacher puts in effort, this may more than compensate for lower qualifications—a teacher 
with a PhD teaching in a primary school will have no impact if she never shows up for work. The 
extent to which qualification matters in teaching rather than effort remains an important research 
topic. 
 
A second basic question is why people send their children to private schools. Is it because there is 
a perceived or actual quality difference between public and private schools? Can poor illiterate 
parents judge the difference between a good and a bad school? How do parents make decisions 
when offered more schooling choices? Answering these questions is essential because any 
educational policy that expands the educational space and does not take into account this dynamic 
of school choice is subject to essentially a version of the “Lucas” critique where the parental 
reaction to any policy could lead to policy ineffectiveness.   
 
The third question left unanswered is the equity implications of private schooling. There is a 
growing concern in Pakistan that private education leads to the emergence of two classes—the 
English-medium trained elite and the vernacular Urdu-medium taught masses. This point has 
been raised numerous times in the popular press, by academics and by populist politicians.24 We 
don’t answer this question fully, but LEAPS and the PIHS data can shed some light on this. The 
rise of private schooling in the rural areas is likely to bring rural and urban areas closer in terms 
of quality education, and at the same time increase disparities within rural areas—that is, children 
                                                 
23 See Banerjee and Duflo (2005) on importance of absent teachers.  
24 See Najam (1998), and The News, March 24, 2004 report on Imran Khan’s views on education.  
http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/mar2004-daily/23-03-2004/metro/k11.htm 
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in villages with private schools will enjoy educational opportunities that bring them closer to their 
urban counterparts; at the same time, children in villages without private schools will likely be 
left further behind. 
 
Finally, we recognize that correlations are not evidence of causation. Our ongoing research in this 
area examines quality issues in private education and the interaction of private and public 
schooling, and focuses more centrally on establishing causality of the linkages mentioned here. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
TABLE 1 
COMPARING VILLAGES WITH AND WITHOUT PRIVATE SCHOOLS 
 
 (1) 
All 4 Provinces 
(2) 
Punjab 
(3) 
Sindh 
(4) 
NWFP 
(5) 
Balochistan 
 Villages 
with a 
private 
school 
Villages 
without  
private 
schools 
Villages 
with a 
private 
school 
Villages 
without 
private 
schools 
Villages 
with a 
private 
school 
Villages 
without  
private 
schools 
Villages 
with a 
private 
school 
Villages 
without  
private 
schools 
Villages 
with a 
private 
school 
Villages 
without  
private 
schools 
Fraction 
Enrolled 0.58* (0.02) 
0.41* 
(0.01) 
0.61* 
(0.02) 
0.46* 
(0.02) 
0.41* 
(0.05) 
0.31* 
(0.02) 
0.55* 
(0.03) 
0.42* 
(0.03) 
0.56* 
(0.02) 
0.41* 
(0.03) 
Fraction 
Females 
Enrolled 
 
0.50* 
(0.02) 
0.29* 
(0.01) 
0.56* 
(0.03) 
0.35* 
(0.02) 
0.28 
(0.05) 
0.20 
(0.02) 
0.42* 
(0.04) 
0.24* 
(0.03) 
0.50* 
(0.05) 
0.26* 
(0.05) 
Fraction Males 
Enrolled 0.66* (0.02) 
0.52* 
(0.01) 
0.67* 
(0.02) 
0.55* 
(0.02) 
0.55 
(0.08) 
0.42 
(0.03) 
0.68 
(0.03) 
0.59 
(0.04) 
0.65* 
(0.02) 
0.54* 
(0.03) 
Private Share 
as a Fraction of 
enrollment 
 
0.20* 
(0.01) 
0.07* 
(0.01) 
0.23* 
(0.02) 
0.11* 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.16* 
(0.02) 
0.05* 
(0.01) 
0.06 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Public share as 
a Fraction of 
enrollment 
 
0.91* 
(0.01) 
0.78* 
(0.01) 
0.75* 
(0.02) 
0.87* 
(0.02) 
0.91* 
(0.03) 
0.97* 
(0.01) 
0.83* 
(0.02) 
0.92* 
(0.01) 
0.91 
(0.03) 
0.98 
(0.01) 
Private Share 
as a Fraction of 
enrollment 
(POOR) 
 
0.13* 
(0.02) 
0.03* 
(0.01) 
0.15* 
(0.02) 
0.5* 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.07 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.01) 0 obs 0 obs 
Private Share 
as a Fraction of 
enrollment 
(MIDDLE) 
 
0.16* 
(0.02) 
0.07* 
(0.02) 
0.20 
(0.02) 
0.12 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.08 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.01) 
0.24* 
(0.05) 
0.00* 
(0.00) 
Private Share 
as a Fraction of 
enrollment 
(RICH) 
0.26* 
(0.02) 
0.11* 
(0.02) 
0.29 
(0.02) 
0.18 
(0.03) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.01) 
0.24* 
(0.03) 
0.09* 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
Source: PIHS 1998, PEIP 2000.  
Standard error of the mean in parentheses. * signifies the difference is significant at the 5% level. Notes: % Enrolled figures 
use the given population ages 5-15. The poor, middle and rich are respectively the lowest, the middle and the top- third of all 
households in terms of consumption of the national rural population.  
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TABLE 2 
DETERMINANTS OF STUDENT ENROLLMENT 
Dependent Variable: Child Enrollment Dummy Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Female -0.163 (0.012)*** 
-0.166 
(0.003)*** 
-0.182 
(0.003)*** 
Private School in Settlement 0.164 (0.020)*** 
0.076 
(0.004)***  
Female and Private School in 
Settlement 
0.081 
(0.014)*** 
0.081 
(0.004)*** 
0.096 
(0.004)*** 
Monthly Expenditure: Rs 
2500-5000 
0.078 
(0.016)*** 
0.074 
(0.003)***  
Monthly Expenditure: >Rs 
5000  
0.110 
(0.021)*** 
0.120 
(0.003)***  
Age 0.147 (0.007)*** 
0.143 
(0.002)*** 
0.146 
(0.002)*** 
Age Squared -0.008 (0.000)*** 
-0.008 
(0.000)*** 
-0.008 
(0.000)*** 
Illiterate Head -0.242 (0.012)*** 
-0.202 
(0.002)***  
Constant 0.073 (0.044)* 
0.139 
(0.012)*** 
0.131 
(0.011)*** 
Fixed Effects none Village Level Household Level 
Observations 147704 147704 149938 
R-squared 0.18 0.12 0.09 
Source: LEAPS 2003 Household Survey 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Notes: OLS regression. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Errors are clustered at the village level 
Observations are all children ages 5 to 15.  Omitted categories for dummy variables are: household has 
literate head; monthly expenditure is below Rs. 2500; no private school in settlement; and child is male 
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TABLE 3 
ANNUAL FEES (in Rs.)  FOR SELF-OWNED (FOR-PROFIT) PRIMARY SCHOOLS 
Province Region Median Mean 
Inter-quartile 
range Number of Schools 
NWFP Urban 1232 1439 844 547 
   (1360)   
 Rural 1152 1249 600 1167 
   (1276)   
Punjab Urban 828 1176 622 4290 
   (3112)   
 Rural 600 723 403 3897 
   (943)   
Sindh Urban 1208 1947 1126 1325 
   (3079)   
 Rural 1080 979 720 77 
   (541)   
Balochistan Urban 1757 1833 1200 61 
   (948)   
 Rural 1265 1293 669 42 
   (734)   
All Pakistan Urban 960 1426 866 6397 
   (3492)   
 Rural 751 892 638 6001 
   (1000)   
Source: PEIP 2000.  
Standard error of the mean in parenthesis. 
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TABLE 4 
TEACHER CHARACTERISTICS 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS 
 Units 
 
Public 
Mean 
Private 
Mean 
Difference of Means 
[z or t - statistic] 
(log) Salary (log Rs.) 8.63 
(0.01) 
6.99 
(0.01) 
1.65 
[106.92] 
     
Gender   (Fraction Male) 0.5708 
(0.01) 
0.2377 
(0.01) 
0.33 
[23.31] 
Age (Years) 38.6 
(0.16) 
25.2 
(0.17) 
13.4 
[57.70] 
Marital Status (Fraction Single) 0.15 
(0.02) 
0.77 
(0.02) 
0.63 
[-17.71] 
Origin  (Fraction Local) 0.25 
(0.01) 
0.52 
(0.01) 
0.27 
[-19.12] 
     
Education % Matric and below 0.36 
(0.01) 
0.41 
(0.01) 
0.06 
[-4.21] 
 % FA/FSc 0.19 
(0.01) 
0.36 
(0.01) 
0.17 
[-13.06] 
 % BA/BSc 0.26 
(0.01) 
0.19 
(0.01) 
0.07 
[6.08] 
 % MA/MSc 0.19 
(0.01) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
0.15 
[16.20] 
     
Training % No Training 0.06 
(0.00) 
0.71 
(0.01) 
0.65 
[-46.37] 
 % PTC/JV/SV 0.44 
(0.01) 
0.15 
(0.01) 
0.29 
[21.45] 
 % CT 0.22 
(0.01) 
0.08 
(0.01) 
0.15 
[13.50] 
 % BEd and above 0.28 
(0.01) 
0.06 
(0.01) 
0.21 
[18.71] 
     
Teaching Experience % < 1 year 0.06 
(0.00) 
0.21 
(0.01) 
0.15 
[-15.19] 
 % 1-3 years 0.05 
(0.00) 
0.39 
(0.01) 
0.34 
[-29.00] 
 % > 3 years 0.88 
(0.01) 
0.40 
(0.01) 
0.49 
[35.61] 
Source: LEAPS 2003 Teacher Roster 
Standard error of the mean in parenthesis. z and t-statistics in brackets. 
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TABLE 5 
HOW ARE PRIVATE SCHOOLS DIFFERENT? : DETERMINANTS OF TEACHER COMPENSATION
Dependent Variable: log Teacher Salary in Rs. ($1 = Rs.60.20) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Public Schools Private Schools All Schools All Schools 
Female 0.022 (0.017) 
-0.333 
(0.052)*** 
0.023 
(0.019) 
0.025 
(0.02) 
Local -0.058 (0.018)*** 
-0.231 
(0.037)*** 
-0.066 
(0.024)*** 
-0.065 
(0.025)** 
Female*Private 
 
 -0.291 (0.053)*** 
-0.275 
(0.047)*** 
Local*Private 
 
 -0.143 (0.049)*** 
-0.082 
(0.044)* 
Private 
 
 -0.721 (0.045)*** 
-0.797 
(0.045)*** 
Education: F.A./F.Sc.. 0.151 (0.028)*** 
0.191 
(0.030)*** 
0.159 
(0.022)*** 
0.145 
(0.020)*** 
Education: B.A./B.Sc. 0.333 (0.037)*** 
0.414 
(0.044)*** 
0.333 
(0.030)*** 
0.312 
(0.027)*** 
Education: M.A./M.Sc. or above 0.502 (0.055)*** 
0.637 
(0.078)*** 
0.475 
(0.039)*** 
0.475 
(0.038)*** 
Training: PTC/JV/SV 0.757 (0.120)*** 
0.032 
-0.032 
0.256 
(0.044)*** 
0.252 
(0.044)*** 
Training: CT 0.68 (0.110)*** 
0.065 
(0.038)* 
0.186 
(0.037)*** 
0.193 
(0.036)*** 
Training: B.Ed. or above 0.738 (0.113)*** 
0.245 
(0.039)*** 
0.278 
(0.042)*** 
0.274 
(0.040)*** 
Experience: 1-3 years 0.131 (0.064)** 
0.079 
(0.023)*** 
0.135 
(0.031)*** 
0.117 
(0.027)*** 
Experience: > 3 years 0.337 (0.060)*** 
0.118 
(0.027)*** 
0.217 
(0.034)*** 
0.21 
(0.032)*** 
Age 0.059 (0.014)*** 
0.03 
(0.007)*** 
0.038 
(0.009)*** 
0.04 
(0.008)*** 
Age Squared 0 (0.000)** 
0 
(0.000)*** 
0 
(0.000)** 
0 
(0.000)*** 
Constant 5.843 (0.253)*** 
6.592 
(0.121)*** 
6.931 
(0.172)*** 
6.926 
(0.155)*** 
Fixed Effects none none none Village Level 
Observations 2596 1956 4552 4552 
R-squared 0.53 0.47 0.83 0.85 
Source: LEAPS 2003 Teacher Roster   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Errors are clustered at the village level.  
Omitted categories for dummy variables are Male, Public School, Not teaching in home village,  
Education: Matric and below, No Training, and Experience < 1 year. 
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TABLE 6 
VILLAGE ATTRIBUTES 
VILLAGES WITH AND WITHOUT PRIVATE SCHOOLS 
 
All 4 Provinces Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan 
 Villages 
with a 
private 
school 
Villages 
without  
private 
schools 
Villages  
with a 
 private  
school 
Villages 
without 
private  
schools 
Villages  
with a  
private  
school 
Villages 
without  
private  
schools 
Villages  
with a  
private  
school 
Villages  
without  
 private  
schools 
Villages  
with a  
private  
school 
Villages  
without   
private  
schools 
Number of 
Settlements 6942 36556 5253 19285 388 5391 1238 5937 63 5943 
Mean  
Population 
4465* 
(54.0) 
1502* 
(9.6) 
4051* 
(54.2) 
1518* 
(11.5) 
4921* 
(301.8) 
2539* 
(35.6) 
6102* 
(158.8) 
1212* 
(21.1) 
4038* 
(692.6) 
797* 
(19.6) 
Fraction  
Literate Adults  
0.428* 
(0.002) 
0.281* 
(0.001) 
0.455* 
(0.002) 
0.350* 
(0.001) 
0.255* 
(0.007) 
0.213* 
(0.002) 
0.375* 
(0.004) 
0.242* 
(0.002) 
0.285* 
(0.019) 
0.143* 
(0.002) 
Fraction  
Permanent 
Houses  
0.596* 
(0.004) 
0.361* 
(0.002) 
0.646* 
(0.004) 
0.452* 
(0.002) 
0.183* 
(0.011) 
0.123* 
(0.002) 
0.536* 
(0.009) 
0.565* 
(0.004) 
0.079 
(0.004) 
0.077 
(0.003) 
Fraction Houses 
with Water 
0.152* 
(0.003) 
0.088* 
(0.001) 
0.125* 
(0.003) 
0.076* 
(0.001) 
0.130* 
(0.010) 
0.100* 
(0.002) 
0.268* 
(0.008) 
0.151* 
(0.004) 
0.320* 
(0.004) 
0.050* 
(0.002) 
Fraction 
Houses with 
Electricity 
0.736* 
(0.003) 
0.435* 
(0.002) 
0.762* 
(0.003) 
0.513* 
(0.003) 
0.407 
(0.017) 
0.425 
(0.005) 
0.741* 
(0.008) 
0.414* 
(0.004) 
0.539* 
(0.004) 
0.213* 
(0.005) 
Average  
Household Size 
7.1* 
(0.01) 
6.67* 
(0.01) 
6.99* 
(0.01) 
6.78* 
(0.01) 
5.56* 
(0.04) 
5.45* 
(0.01) 
8.06* 
(0.04) 
7.76* 
(0.02) 
6.23 
(0.24) 
6.36 
(0.03) 
Village Area 2755* (63.5) 
2209* 
(26.8) 
2109* 
(43.4) 
1523* 
(20.5) 
8337* 
(659.9) 
4302* 
(109.7) 
3807* 
(198.7) 
2371* 
(92.3) 
3914 
(800.8) 
2619 
(82.6) 
Source: Population Census 1998, PEIP 2000.  
* if difference is significant at the 5% level.  
Standard errors of the mean in parenthesis. 
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TABLE 7 
 PUBLIC-PRIVATE COMPLEMENTARITY 
 Villages with Private 
Schools (%) 
Number of educated 
women per village 
Number of 
educated women 
per 1000 
population 
Does not have girls primary or 
secondary school 0.12 12.27 12.9 
Received girls primary only in 
last 20 years 0.13 12.41 16.2 
Received girls primary and 
secondary in last 20 years 0.31 27.71 18.8 
Source: Population Census 1998, PEIP 2000, EMIS 2000 
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Figure 1: The Growth of Private Schools 
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Notes:  The figure shows the number of private schools in 2000 that were set up in each of the relevant 
years. For instance, of all the schools in the country in 2000, 8000 were set up in 2000, 7000 were set up in 
199 and only 200 were setup in 1980. The data are from the census of private schools carried out by the 
Federal Bureau of Statistics in 2001. We omit the last year, since the survey was carried out at the beginning 
of the year. 
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Figure 2: Growth Rate of enrollment in public and private schools 
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Notes: Based on PIHS data, 1991 and 2001. The horizontal axis shows income deciles ranked in order of 
increasing income at the national, rural and urban levels. The vertical axis shows the growth in net 
enrollment rate in the private and public sector. Thus, for instance, the national figure shows that highest 
growth was among the lowest income deciles, but that within rural and within urban areas higher income 
deciles saw greater growth in private schooling during the nineties. Across all regions and income deciles, 
there was a decline in public sector growth during the nineties. Note that growth rates could not be 
calculated for the bottom two deciles in rural areas, since the initial level was zero. 
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Figure 3: Enrollment and School-Presence 
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Notes: Based on a census of schooling-choice carried out among 80,000 households under the LEAPS 
study. A settlement is a distinct geographically separable subset of a village. There are 215 delineated 
settlements in 112 villages in the LEAPS sample.  
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Figure 4: Teacher Salaries: The Public/Private Wage Gap 
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Notes: Based on a census of 4,830 teachers in 810 public and private schools carried out as part of the 
LEAPS surveys. The first bar shows the average wage of a public school teacher; the second shows the 
average wage of a private school teacher. The third bar presents the wage a teacher with the characteristics 
of a public school teacher would earn if he/she were to move to a private school. This predicted wage is 
based on a regression of private school wages on gender, whether the teacher is local, age, training, 
education, experience, and absenteeism. 
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Figure 5: Decomposition of the Public/Private Wage Gap 
Public/Private Wage Premiums and Penalties
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Notes: Based on a census of 4,830 teachers in 810 public and private schools carried out as part of the 
LEAPS surveys. The figure plots the coefficients presented in Table 5, which explains wages in the public 
and private sector as a function of training, gender, residence, education, absenteeism, age and experience. 
Positive numbers are premiums, negative are penalties. 
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Figure 6: Teacher Absenteeism 
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Notes: Based on a census of 4,830 teachers in 810 public and private schools carried out as 
part of the LEAPS surveys. Absenteeism data reported by the head teacher or the school 
owner, shows the number of days absent in the previous month. 
